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Abstract 
Insofar as democracy is a product of long-term diffusion, scholars generally focus on colonialism 
(especially English) or religion (especially Protestant). Here, we focus on a third pathway from 
Europe – Europeans. We show that there is a persistent relationship between the share of 
Europeans in a society and its regime type. We conjecture that this is because Europeans viewed 
democracy as a basic right – for themselves. It was a club that produced club goods (excludable 
goods such as property rights and civil liberties). Hence, where Europeans were in the majority 
they were democrats. Where they were the minority they were indifferent or hostile, or they 
embraced a restricted form of democracy that excluded non-Europeans. And where Europeans 
were entirely absent there was no one – at least initially – to carry the democratic torch. To test 
this argument we assemble an original dataset measuring the diffusion of Europeans across the 
world from 1600 to the present. This is employed to predict democracy in a series of analyses that 
focus on various indicators of democracy and a variety of samples, specifications, time-periods, 
and estimators, including fixed effects and instrumental variables. The evidence offers strong 
support for the thesis. 
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Introduction 
Democracy is often viewed as a product of diffusion, understood loosely as the adoption of norms 
and institutions from other states. Studies of diffusion typically focus on proximal relationships, 
where an event at year t affects another event at t+1 (e.g., Brinks, Coppedge 2006).  
Long-term diffusion – taking place over decades or centuries – has received less attention, 
perhaps because it is harder to assess. One line of work focuses on colonialism, where studies 
indicate that a wide variety of factors associated with colonialism, and British rule in particular, 
made democratic outcomes more likely in years following independence (Bernhard et al. 2004; 
Hariri 2012; Lange, Mahoney, Vom Hau 2006; Olsson 2009). Another line of work focuses on 
Protestantism, where researchers find a positive association between the spread of Protestant sects 
and the rise of democracy in the contemporary era (Anderson 2004; Brown 1944; Bruce 2004; 
Tusalem 2009; Woodberry 2012). Both factors may be regarded as emanations of Europe.  
 In this study, we focus on a third pathway from Europe – Europeans. The presence of 
Europeans is a widely recognized factor in economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 
2001, 2002; Easterly, Levine 2016; Engerman, Sokoloff 2012; Glaeser et al. 2004; Mahoney 2010; 
Putterman, Weil 2010). However, its possible role in democratization has not been systematically 
assessed. 
Beginning about 1500, with the advent of sailing vessels capable of circumnavigating the 
globe, Europeans began to populate the distant abroad. By 1900, they could be found virtually 
everywhere, in varying proportions. We argue that the resulting ratio of Europeans/non-
Europeans structured the fate of democracy around the world. Where Europeans were numerous 
(relative to indigenes and migrants from elsewhere), they championed some form of popular 
sovereignty, though often with restrictions limiting suffrage or office-holding to those of 
European heritage. Where they were in the minority they were more reticent and often actively 
resisted democratization. And where Europeans were entirely absent there was no one – at least 
initially – to carry the democratic torch. We argue that this demographic mechanism was probably 
the most powerful pathway of democratic diffusion from Europe to the world and one of the 
more enduring causes of regime-type in the modern era. 
Section I lays out the argument. Section II presents an original dataset measuring the 
spread of Europeans throughout the world from 1600 to the present. Section III offers a series of 
analyses that test the argument with qualitative historical data and also quantitative measures of 
democracy and European ancestry. Appendices (on-line) present sources (A), codings of 
European ancestry for each territory (B), maps of the world illustrating European ancestry at 
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various points in time (C), convergent validity tests for the key variable of theoretical interest (D), 
descriptions of each variable used on all analyses (E), robustness tests (F), and alternative accounts 
(G). 
 
I. Argument 
The outcome of theoretical interest is democracy, a term encapsulating a wide range of meanings 
in the modern era. At the most abstract level, democratic principles include representation, 
consent, accountability, political equality, individual liberty, and popular sovereignty. At a more 
disaggregated level, attributes associated with democracy include the sovereignty of elective bodies 
(vis-à-vis unelective bodies), competitive multi-party elections, universal suffrage, constitutional 
constraints on the exercise of power, civil liberties, and citizenship (for all those born within the 
boundaries claimed by a state who subsequently live out their lives subject to its laws). All of these 
attributes are implied by the concept of democracy, as we use the term here. 
When we make statements about the democratic or autocratic nature of a polity at some 
point in history we invoke an implicit comparison-set of other societies existing at that time. We 
recognize that no societies were fully democratic (by today’s standards). Indeed, prior to the 
twentieth century “democracy” was not an especially popular term. (Preferred terms included 
freedom, liberty, self-government, representative government, responsible government, 
republican government, and political rights.) Even so, at any given point in time some societies 
were more democratic than others. It is this difference of degrees that we wish to explain. 
Our argument builds upon three facts about the modern world that we take for granted 
and do not attempt to explain. First, Europe was the birthplace of democracy. Second, Europeans 
adopted a racialized view of society, defining their identity and interests separate from non-
Europeans. Third, Europeans were globally dominant – militarily, politically, and to some extent 
culturally.  
With this as background, democracy may be viewed as a method of governance whose 
feasibility and payoffs (to Europeans) depended upon the demographic balance of Europeans and 
non-Europeans within a society. Where Europeans composed a majority of the population, 
democracy offered a convenient system for monopolizing political power. Rule by the people 
meant rule by white people, and they had the infrastructure (education, wealth, etc.) to make it 
work. Where Europeans composed a substantial minority they could still achieve this result, but 
to do so they needed to prevent the majority from participating or to successfully coerce/coopt 
their political opponents, a precarious feat that (it turned out) could not be sustained indefinitely. 
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Where Europeans composed a tiny fraction of the population, establishing a democratic system 
of rule was neither practicable nor necessary, as European interests could be coordinated through 
informal channels within a small (and presumably tightly-knit) community. Regime types therefore 
evolved from the intersection of European ideas and interests with varying demographic realities. 
In the following sections, we elaborate on this thesis. 
Democracy for Europeans 
Europeans were the first to develop representative institutions, to hold elections for public office, 
and to constrain the use of political power by constitutional rules. Exactly why democracy arose 
in Europe and not elsewhere is a conundrum that we shall not attempt to unravel (for varying 
perspectives see Cartledge 2016; Schulz et al. 2018; Stasavage 2016). We know that it was a long, 
slow, and halting development, with many reversals and many shifts of course across the continent. 
Nonetheless, democracy has deep roots in Europe, which remains the most democratic region of 
the world today.  
 Europe also developed into the world’s first global hegemon, inaugurating an age of 
imperialism (Abernethy 2000). As Europeans conquered the world, they brought their ideas about 
political organization with them. Democracy in English colonies was viewed by colonists as an 
extension of the rights of Englishmen, a clear instance of intellectual diffusion (Greene 2010; 
Kammen 1969; Ward 1976). Representative institutions in Spanish and Portuguese America 
developed later and might be viewed as a reaction against the authoritarianism of the colonizer. 
However, constitutional thought and the Latin American constitutions that resulted were modeled 
on European exemplars – ancient Greece and Rome, Renaissance Italy, contemporary England, 
revolutionary France, the Netherlands, the short liberal episodes of Spain (1812, 1820-1823), the 
long history of local government (cabildos) in Spain, and the former English colony to the North, 
the United States (Demélas-Bohy, Guerra 1996; Graham 1994: 73; Guerra 1994; Rodríguez O. 
1998; Sabato 2018: 5). Democracy in French colonies was directly linked to France insofar as 
colonnes participated in elections to the Assemblee Nationale and often viewed themselves as children 
of the French Revolution (Choi 2016; Johnson 1971; Southworth 1931). Wherever they happened 
to be situated, Europeans tended to view themselves as rights-bearers – inheritors of the legacy of 
the Classical age, the Enlightenment, and the age of Revolution (Armitage, Subrahmanyam 2009; 
Simon 2017). 
Europeans also developed and carried with them other features that might be regarded as 
forming the infrastructure of democracy, e.g., written languages, educational systems, advanced 
transport and communication systems, urban patterns of settlement, nuclear family structures, 
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nation-states, property rights, capitalist economies, and wealth (comparatively speaking). We do 
not know which of these features (often associated with the process of modernization) is most 
important for democracy (Knutsen et al. 2018; Murtin, Wacziarg 2014; Schulz et al. 2018). But we 
do know that they developed in tandem and were closely interconnected.  
Because democracy was valued by Europeans, and because they possessed the 
infrastructure required for sustaining democratic forms of government, it is not surprising that 
democracy arose first in areas inhabited by Europeans. In this respect, as in many others, colonies 
in the New World were a continuation of the Old – “Neo-Europes” (Crosby 1986).  
However, democracy was not viewed by Europeans as a nostrum suitable for all peoples 
everywhere. Even within Europe, there were limitations on who could participate in politics 
(Goldstein 2013). Outside Europe, it was generally assumed that non-whites were incapable of 
self-government, or that they would need many years of apprenticeship before developing that 
capacity (Fieldhouse 1966; Fradera 2018; Huttenback 1976; Lynch 1973; Reinsch 1906: 197; Ross 
1982; Ward 1976; Waterhouse 2010: 240-45; Wight 1946). 
 This belief had a number of underpinnings. It drew on a vision of democracy in which 
citizens must possess property (signaling their independence) and education (signaling their 
capacity for rational thought). It drew on a Euro-centric vision of the world in which non-
Europeans were savage (uncivilized, ungodly) or servile (in thrall to despots or masters), and hence 
unable to govern themselves in a responsible manner. In a much-quoted passage, J.S. Mill (1862) 
articulates the enlightened opinion of the day… 
It is now a fixed principle of the policy of Great Britain…that her colonies of 
European race, equally with the parent country, possess the fullest measure of 
internal self-government…But there are others which have not attained that 
state, and which, if held at all, must be governed by the dominant country, or 
by persons delegated for that purpose by it. This mode of government is as 
legitimate as any other, if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization 
of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of 
improvement. There are, as we have already seen, conditions of society in which 
a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the 
people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher 
civilization…The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects all that 
could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs, guaranteed by irresistible 
force against the precariousness of tenure attendant on barbarous despotisms, 
and qualified by their genius to anticipate all that experience has taught to the 
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more advanced nation. Such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous 
or semi-barbarous one.1  
Abstract considerations of political theory intermingled with overt racism in European thought. 
We must also consider how defining democratic capacities in this exclusive fashion may 
have served the interests of Europeans. “Democracy” (along with associated ideals of equality, 
representation, and so forth) provided a convenient mechanism for binding together members of 
the European community, overcoming class antagonisms and monopolizing power in 
heterogeneous societies around the world. While the economic interests of a European worker 
and large landowner might differ, they were both granted civil and political rights and in this 
fashion differentiated themselves from those who fell on the wrong side of the color line (Morgan 
1975). Insofar as the exercise of democratic rights was reserved for Europeans it also served as a 
mechanism of political control – useful for the passage of discriminatory property rights laws and 
measures of “self-defense” that displaced indigenous peoples and made room for European 
settlers (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 259; Lützelschwab 2013; Woollacott 2015: 99). 
 Thus did values and interests combine to make democracy (for Europeans) a popular ideal 
(among Europeans). Avid proselytizers of property rights and Christianity, Europeans were not 
keen to spread the gospel of democracy among indigenes, transplanted migrant workers, and 
slaves. Political freedom meant freedom for whites – more precisely, white men (Foner 1994; 
Greene 2010; Huttenback 1976; Lake 2012; Morgan 1975). 
To be sure, Europeans sometimes extended civil and political rights to non-Europeans. 
However, emancipation, enfranchisement, and qualification for public office for indigenous 
people came about with greatest alacrity in places where Europeans predominated. Here, the 
extension of rights posed little threat to European hegemony. By contrast, where Europeans were 
in the minority, fear of popular uprisings or popular rule prompted Europeans to resist 
democratization, or to resist independence from the metropole wherever that seemed destined to 
inaugurate mass democracy (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 139, 332; Dippel, Carvalho 2015; Greene 2010: 
76; Lynch 1973: 20, 51, 127, 158, 163, 190, 265, 325; Williams 1970: ch 22). 
Democracy as a Club 
From a longer perspective our narrative suggests a historical model in which democracy serves as 
a coordinating device for group interests.  
Beginning in the medieval period, communes, guilds, parties, fraternities, companies, 
churches, and universities in Europe were formally incorporated based on models drawn from 
                                               
1 For a review of recent work on liberalism and empire see Sartori (2006). 
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Roman and/or canon law. They also developed methods of governance – consultative and 
decisionmaking bodies, judicial bodies, formal limits on the exercise of executive power, methods 
of leadership selection and de-selection, protected rights for all members, and so forth – that 
presage contemporary democratic institutions (Berman 1997; Bilder 2006; Black 1984; Ciepley 
2017; Greif 2006; McLaughlin 1932: 50; Maitland 2003; Post 1943; Runciman 2000; Tierney 1982).  
Over time, these corporations “acquired a legal personality and began to perform functions 
of a semi-public nature” (Najemy 1979: 49-50). However, they remained corporate bodies with 
strictly limited memberships whose purpose was focused primarily on advancing the interests of 
their members. It is not surprising, therefore, that when forming new political communities 
Europeans regarded themselves as owners of corporations that performed acts of governance, 
primarily for their own benefit. This legacy can be found in colonial charters (Lutz 1988) and in 
municipal charters (Weinbaum 2010). Indeed, municipalities continued to function as the property 
of their shareholders, i.e., ratepayers, into the twentieth century in cities like Chicago 
(Einhorn 2001).  
Of course, the governance of a political community involved spillover effects to the rest 
of society since some policies are non-excludable. However, the distinction between members 
(citizens) and non-members generated an exclusivist polity in which only members (conventionally 
defined as those with suffrage rights) enjoyed full civil rights and property rights. These policies 
were (and are) strictly excludable. 
From this perspective, democracy began as a club and its policies may be regarded as club 
goods. Since club membership was defined primarily by race (a marker of European origin), the 
extent to which this club was inclusive or exclusive (relative to the community in which it was 
situated) depended upon the demographic heritage of a society. Where the population was 
predominantly non-European, club membership was restrictive and democracy accordingly 
limited. Where the population was predominantly European, club membership was expansive and 
club goods were indistinguishable from public goods. In this fashion, demography structured 
regime outcomes.2 
Summary and Implications  
Our main thesis is that prospects for democracy in the modern era vary with the share of 
Europeans in a society. Of course, this does not imply that regime types are solely a product of the 
beliefs and actions of Europeans. Many other factors come into play – not the least of which are 
                                               
2 This schema bears resemblance to selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Note, however, that the 
latter intends to explain the quality of governance while our goal is to explain regime types. 
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the preferences and actions of non-Europeans. Nonetheless, there is good reason to imagine that 
Europeans had considerable influence on the course of regimes over the past two centuries. 
We argue, second, that European influence flowed mostly through demographic channels. 
Other channels such as religion (e.g., Protestantism) and colonialism (formal control by a 
European hegemon) were less important.  
We argue, third, that limitations on democratic development were manifested by the 
exclusion of non-Europeans from the franchise (suffrage) and from the privilege of holding public 
office. The racial line dividing Europeans and non-Europeans was reflected in the institutions 
Europeans created. 
We argue, fourth, that non-Europeans were more likely to be included as full (or partial) 
members of the political community where they were few in number – and hence, less threatening 
to European hegemony. 
We argue, finally, that the relationship between European demography and regime type 
changed over time. It follows from our previous arguments that this relationship was apt to be 
strongest at a point in history (a) when the ideal of democracy was widely embraced by Europeans 
but before it diffused widely among non-Europeans, (b) when racial distinctions between 
Europeans and non-Europeans were pervasive and invidious, and (c) when Europeans exercised 
greatest influence in the world. It seems plausible that these factors reached their apogee sometime 
in the twentieth century. By the end of that century, ideas and practices associated with democracy 
diffused to such an extent that it could no longer be regarded as a European patrimony. 
Additionally, ideas about national identity and race evolved such that the color line separating 
Europeans and non-Europeans blurred or become less consequential. Finally, the global 
hegemony of Europeans waned – including the termination of virtually all overseas colonies – 
such that Europeans could no longer impose their preferred political institutions on the rest of the 
world. These trends seem likely to continue. Thus, although the legacy of the European era 
persists, its effects seem likely to weaken as time goes on. 
In summary, our arguments suggest one main hypothesis and several ancillary hypotheses: 
H1  European ancestry (the share of people in a territory whose ancestors hail 
from Europe) is a distal cause of democracy. 
Ha  Other pathways from Europe such as religion and colonial control are more 
weakly correlated with democracy. 
Hb  Civil and political rights are allocated so as to exclude non-Europeans, de jure 
or de facto.  
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Hc  The inclusion of non-Europeans is more likely where they are fewer in 
number. 
Hd  The relationship between European demography and democracy peaked in 
the mid-twentieth century, declining thereafter. 
These propositions will be explored in Section III. We do not intend to demonstrate the causal 
mechanisms at work in this explanatory sketch as these factors are hard to measure and difficult 
to distinguish. 
 
II. The Diffusion of Europeans 
European out-migration began with the age of exploration and continued on a sizeable scale 
through the early twentieth century.3 During this period, an estimated 60-65 million Europeans 
left the continent for points abroad (Etemad 2007: 18). After World War One, migration slowed 
to a trickle due to the demographic transition in Europe as well as improvements in European 
economies and the growth of welfare states, relieving pressure on potential emigrants. The 
following discussion therefore focuses on the era of mass European migration, circa 1500-1914, 
and especially on early waves of emigration (prior to 1850). Later migrants generally followed in 
the footsteps of their predecessors – typically, members of their family or village – and were 
responsive to economic and demographic realities that earlier settlers had established. 
For European emigrants some destinations were preferred to others. Distance appears to 
have been a minor factor. To be sure, North America was closer to Europe than South America, 
and ocean passage was accordingly cheaper and less onerous. This may account for the higher rate 
of immigration to the US (especially among poor emigrants) relative to other destinations in the 
Americas. These are marginal differences, however. Central Europe, the Mediterranean, and 
Africa, the areas closest to Western Europe, received very few emigrants, while New Zealand and 
Australia, at the other end of the world, became “Little Englands.” Instead of distance, European 
migration choices were structured primarily by geography and disease. Healthful climates were 
generally located away from the equatorial zone, where malaria and other dangers lurked. Of equal 
concern was the ready availability of land that was fertile and cheap.  
Our concern, however, is not with European migration per se but rather with the resulting 
demographic balance between European and non-European populations. Regardless of how many 
                                               
3 The thumbnail sketch in this section of the paper draws on a large body of work on European migration and 
colonialism (Abernethy 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001; Belich 2009; Canny 1994; Curtin 1989, 1998, 2002; 
Easterly, Levine 2016; Engerman, Sokoloff 2012; Etemad 2007; Fieldhouse 1966; Hatton, Williamson 2005; Hoerder, 
Moch 1996; Lange, Mahoney, Vom Hau 2006; Mahoney 2010; Moch 2003; Nugent 1989). 
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Europeans entered a society, where indigenous people were densely settled they were unlikely to 
lose their demographic predominance. This describes much of Asia, some parts of Africa (in the 
tropical regions), and the equatorial region of the Americas (from southern Mexico to Peru). 
Demography played an especially important role in the New World, where indigenes were 
susceptible to the scourge of European diseases (smallpox, influenza et al.). Where populations 
were densely settled, they tended to recover quickly as resistances built up; where populations were 
diffusely settled, they might never recover and were in any case easy to displace. 
A second factor affecting demographic balance were the commodities encouraged by a 
region’s geography. Family farming was not as remunerative as labor-intensive cash crops (sugar, 
tobacco, cotton, coffee, tea, cocoa, sisal, oil seeds, oil palms, rubber, or fruit) or mining (e.g., for 
gold or silver). Thus, where soil and climate resources allowed, or where natural resources were 
discovered underground (alluvial deposits could be harvested by individual miners working for 
themselves on the model of the California and Alaska gold rushes), these industries proliferated. 
To be profitable in a low-technology environment, plantations and mines required a large labor 
force that would do hard and dangerous work under close supervision for little or no 
remuneration. Europeans would not abide by these conditions except under temporary 
arrangements of indentured servitude. Consequently, plantation and mining economies came to 
be dominated by non-European workers – indigenes, slaves imported from Africa, or migrant 
workers from Asia. 
In summary, where climate and soil were suitable for European emigration and the 
establishment of family farms and where indigenous populations were diffuse, Europeans usually 
became a sizeable ethnic group. This describes the Americas (especially away from the equator), 
Australasia, and the southern tip of Africa. Where geographic and demographic conditions were 
not propitious, Europeans may have operated trading posts, mines, plantations, or missions; they 
might have also controlled the levers of political, military, and economic power; and they might 
have established colonies that endured for centuries. However, their demographic presence was 
slight. 
Europe 
We turn now to problems of conceptualization and measurement. The region known today as 
Europe is a cultural construction, open to varying interpretations that change over time 
(Pagden 2002). As a rough-and-ready definition, we shall say that a country is a part of the 
European cultural area if its principal or official language was Latinate or Germanic in the modern 
era. This decision-rule generates a list of contemporary states including Andorra, Austria, Belgium, 
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Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, 
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom. For present purposes, “Europeans” are those whose ancestors lived in this 
region in 1500. 
 Of course, Europe could be defined differently. One might mark its territory by the 
furthest extent of the Roman Empire or by the spread of Roman Catholicism (prior to the 
Reformation). One might extend its borders to include more of Central Europe or Southern 
Europe, or shrink its borders to exclude the Celtic fringe. One might include countries like the 
Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia that are commonly regarded as European. 
However, these minor adjustments would have negligible impact on our analysis, as out-migration 
from different parts of Europe tended to follow in the footsteps of migrations from the core states 
of Western Europe.  
European Ancestry 
The variable of theoretical interest, European ancestry, is the share of people living in a society who 
are European by ancestry. It is an open question how to define a European, given the mixed 
ancestry of most people in the modern era. The same problem besets work on ethnicity and race 
(Lieberman, Singh 2012; Simon, Piché, Gagnon 2015). Lines were drawn differently at different 
times and places, and where populations inter-mixed over long periods these lines were especially 
blurry.  
We adopt a constructivist definition of ancestry. A European is what people – specifically, 
surveyors and enumerators – understand to be European, an understanding that is likely to change 
over time and is especially elastic in places with high rates of intermarriage such as Latin America. 
Having said this, we expect that group categories are never constructed out of whole cloth. An 
individual classified by surveyors or enumerators as European is likely to have a substantial genetic 
tie to people living in Europe in 1500.  
In treating Europeans as a corporate group we do not mean to suggest that all Europeans 
were the same. Differences in cultures and institutional practices across countries were 
considerable, and we assume that this mattered for economic development and the spread of 
democracy (Bernhard et al. 2004; Lange, Mahoney, Vom Hau 2006; Olsson 2009). Yet, there is 
reason to suppose that differences attenuated over time as settlers from different countries 
assimilated the ideals of the Enlightenment and began to think of themselves as inheriting a 
common European culture rather than a specifically British, Dutch, French, et al. culture.  
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Relatedly, we treat Europeans within each colony or country as a unitary group, overlooking 
cleavages based on country of origin, language, religion, and ideology. Of course, every European 
settlement generated its own intra-European conflicts, and these gradations of status and power 
were consequential. However, when it came to establishing basic rules and norms about who could 
vote, hold office, or enjoy civil rights, distinctions among Europeans were less relevant than 
distinctions between Europeans and non-Europeans. In constitutional matters, race trumped 
nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, and party (Fredrickson 2002: 68; Gann, Duignan 1962: 69; 
Giliomee, Elphick 1979: 359-60; Mills 1997). In this respect, we feel justified in treating Europeans 
as a category.  
Precisely why race came to predominate over other identities is a question that we leave in 
abeyance, though we presume that the encounter between Europeans and the wider world that 
occurred during the age of imperialism was of critical importance. In an age before passports, 
distinctive skin pigmentation allowed Europeans to readily distinguish themselves from natives, 
migrant laborers, and slaves, facilitating the perpetuation of a hierarchical order (Allen 1994; Belich 
2009: 5; Fanon 1970; Fradera 2018; Kennedy 1987; Mohanram 2007; Pagden 2009; Ross 1982). 
Counting Europeans 
Measuring the number of Europeans who were present in societies around the world across the 
past several centuries is not an easy matter, and not one that modern demographers have attended 
to. Consequently, there is no standard database that one might draw upon. 
In some respects, historical data on Europeans is apt to be more accurate than data on 
non-Europeans. After all, Europeans were responsible for most surveys and censuses during the 
colonial period and one can be fairly confident that they counted themselves. The fact that they 
tended to have sedentary lifestyles and often lived in cities meant that they were easily accessible. 
By contrast, counting indigenous people in the bush was more difficult, and one might assume 
that enumerators were less motivated to do so. Thus, in many situations our numerator (number 
of Europeans) may be regarded as more accurate than our denominator (total population). 
 The numerator suffers from a serious problem of definition, however. It is never easy to 
distinguish those with European ancestry from everyone else, especially where inheritances are 
mixed. Surveys might classify respondents by country (e.g., “English”), by continent (e.g., 
“European”), or by race (e.g., “white”). Consistent with our constructivist approach, we assume 
that local practices governed how these categories were defined and operationalized, that there 
were differences across polities and across colonizers (McNamee 2018), and that definitions of 
who was “white” or “European” changed over time (Carvalho 2004; Loveman 2014). To deal with 
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cross-regional heterogeneity we include regional dummies and conduct sub-sample analyses 
focused on specific colonizers – British, Spanish, and French. To deal with cross-temporal 
heterogeneity we include year dummies and sub-sample analyses focused on particular eras. 
 Even so, the question of ancestry was not entirely fluid – especially during the pre-
contemporary era. Prior to the twentieth century, the color line was strictly monitored and policed 
in most societies throughout the world. At any given time, most people had a clear sense of where 
they stood and could do little about it. The rigidity of race makes it a harder, more exogenous 
category than it is today. However noxious, race-consciousness undergirds our statistics. Indeed, 
a primary purpose for gathering demographic data in which people are classified by origin or 
pigmentation was presumably to reinforce these invidious distinctions (Loveman 2009; Nobles 
2000). Thus, despite the weaknesses of census/survey methodology we have greater confidence 
in the numerator in historical eras – when it had a clear meaning – than in the contemporary era, 
when its meaning seems increasingly ambiguous and when the categories sometimes disappear 
entirely from censuses and surveys. Historians and social scientists – not to mention, 
contemporaries – discuss the presence of Europeans as if there was something real out there. 
Likewise, studies of ethnicity, religion, and other ascriptive categories assume that these culturally 
defined categories were, and are, meaningful. We shall do the same, with the usual caveats. 
 To maximize coverage, minimize stochastic error, and to get a sense of convergent validity, 
we collect data from as many sources as possible. We begin with the most recent global dataset 
compiled by Easterly, Levine (2016) from thirty-nine secondary sources. This is supplemented by 
our own collection, integrating data from over fifty secondary sources (a few of which overlap 
with Easterly, Levine). These secondary sources, listed in Appendix A, cull innumerable primary 
sources, i.e., censuses, surveys, and informal estimates.  
Statistics of interest include (a) number of Europeans, (b) total population, and (c) 
European share of population. Where only one of these elements is missing it is calculated by the 
authors. Where total population is missing we draw upon Fariss et al. (2017), which aggregates a 
number of primary datasets. From these sources, we assemble 2,193 data points representing the 
demographic histories of 237 countries and colonies from 1600 to 2017. (Twenty-three percent of 
these data points are drawn from Easterly and Levine.)  
Aggregation and Missingness 
To aggregate estimates across multiple sources and to generate a continuous dataset with estimates 
for each territory-year (back to 1600) we take several additional steps. For territories outside 
Europe (as defined), we mark the date of the first recorded European settlement or (if the latter is 
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unknown) the first European contact. This is coded as zero (no Europeans), forming the first data 
point in the series. For territories within Europe, we record the number of Europeans as 100% in 
1950. This estimate is extended back to 1600 under the assumption that the share of Europeans 
within a territory did not change greatly during a period when in-migration (from outside Europe) 
was limited.  
For the remaining time-period (after the point of first European contact for non-European 
territories and after 1950 for European territories), we estimate yearly data points across available 
data using a loess smoother that regresses population on year with smoothing parameter a=0.85.  
The quadratic function is appropriate for data patterns with a single curvature, as is the case for 
most territories under observation – where the share of Europeans increases to a peak and then 
decreases, forming an inverted-U shape. For European countries, the share of Europeans tends to 
decrease in a monotonic fashion after 1950, also nicely captured by the quadratic function.  
To give readers a sense of the data, our sources, and our method of interpolating missing 
values, we produce graphs for each territory, shown in Appendix B. We also produce maps of the 
world at century-long intervals, shown in Appendix C. Reassuringly, our measure of European 
ancestry is highly correlated with other attempts to measure this concept, as shown in Table D.1. 
 A histogram of the European ancestry variable, in Figure 1, shows bimodal peaks located 
at each end of the scale. Most polities have little or no Europeans, a handful have lots of 
Europeans, and the rest fall somewhere in between. This suggests that most of the variation in our 
outcome may be driven by the polar extremes. Helpfully, measurement error at the extremes is 
less likely than measurement error in the middle. Yet, we do not regard European ancestry as a 
binary variable in disguise. Indeed, we show that the relationship of theoretical interest is robust 
even when each mode is excluded from the analysis (see Table 3). 
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Figure 1:  Histogram of European Ancestry 
 
 
III. Analysis 
To test our main hypotheses along with various sub-hypotheses listed at the end of Section I, we 
begin by exploring the relationship between European ancestry and democracy in the colonial and 
immediate post-colonial eras, drawing on a vast library of historical work. Next, we conduct a 
series of wide-ranging tests in which an indicator of democracy is regressed against our measure 
of European ancestry. To probe robustness, we employ various indicators of democracy and a 
variety of samples, specifications, time-periods, and estimators, including fixed effects and 
instrumental variables. 
The Colonial and post-Colonial Experience 
If Europeans affected the rise of democracy around the world we ought to see this relationship 
manifested during the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras, when European power was at its 
apex. In this section, we focus on sets of colonies/countries that were under the control of a single 
colonizer. This allows us to hold constant important background features while focusing on factors 
of theoretical interest. We are also able to exploit within-unit (within-colony or within-country) 
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variation. Note, however, that due to space-constraints we are limited to a very schematic account 
of complex historical realities. Readers may refer to the cited literature for more depth and detail. 
Across British colonies in the Americas, European settlers were often a substantial 
minority and sometimes an outright majority. In these settings, settlers usually won rights of self-
government, thereby establishing some of the oldest legislatures and the earliest examples of 
contested elections in the world. Vibrant assemblies were founded throughout the region, e.g., in 
Virginia (1619), Bermuda (1620), Massachusetts Bay (1634), Maryland (1638), Connecticut (1637), 
Plymouth (1639), New Haven (1639), Barbados (1639), St Kitts (1642), Antigua (1644), Rhode 
Island (1647), Montserrat (1654), Nevis (1658), Jamaica (1664), North Carolina (1665), South 
Carolina (1671), East Jersey (1668), West Jersey (1681), New Hampshire (1680), Pennsylvania 
(1682), and New York (1683) (Kammen 1969: 11-12). These assemblies continued to thrive where 
the demographic balance tilted toward Europeans. But where the black population outstripped the 
European population, threatening revolt or majority rule, Europeans and their descendants 
generally resisted independence or relinquished rights to self-governance by transitioning to a 
Crown colony (Dippel, Carvalho 2015). The only case of persisting self-government and ongoing 
democratic institutions in a colony without a white majority occurred in Barbados, where 
European colonists and their descendants comprised a substantial minority of the population, 
sufficient to maintain political control until near the end of the colonial era (Beckles 1990).  
Within the British colonies that became the United States the development of democracy 
was contingent upon solving the so-called race problem (Myrdal 1944). Marked differences could 
be found in the ratio of whites/blacks across regions, with African Americans constituting a 
substantial minority (and occasionally a majority) of the population in the South and in smaller 
numbers elsewhere. Consistent with our hypothesis, African Americans generally enjoyed greater 
civil and political rights in parts of the country (initially colonies, later states) where they were least 
numerous as a share of the general population (Acharya, Blackwell, Sen 2018; Klinkner, Smith 
1999). Accordingly, subnational authoritarianism survived in regions where black Americans were 
persistently excluded – by slavery, Jim Crow, or other, more subtle maneuvers (Key 1949; Mickey 
2015).  
In the southern tip of Africa, European settlers never gained the demographic hegemony 
they enjoyed in North America. However, the demographic balance was quite different across the 
various British colonies. Europeans were a much higher share of the population in Cape Colony 
than in Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State (Curtin et al. 1995: 293). Consistent with the 
patterns found in the US, Cape Colony established the most liberal suffrage laws, a (formally) race-
blind policy that was maintained for several decades after independence within the rubric of the 
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Union of South Africa (Curtin et al. 1995: 437-8; Edgecombe 1978; McCracken 1967). As in the 
US, blacks were allowed to play a role in politics only where their role was subordinate, and this, 
in turn, was a product of demography. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Jews – mostly Ashkenazi, originating in 
areas controlled by the Holy Roman Empire – settled in Palestine, forming the social base of what 
would become a British Mandate (1922-) and eventually a Jewish state (1948-). This small area of 
predominantly European settlers has been the most democratic region of the Middle East 
throughout the twentieth century, despite the exclusion of many of the original inhabitants. Here, 
as elsewhere, “Democracy is constituted and functions as ‘a defensive democracy,’ a political 
system designed to deter and to outlaw highly menacing groups” (Smooha 2002: 478). 
The connection between race and responsible government was also apparent in British 
colonial policy throughout the era (Albertini, Wirz 1982; Ward 1976; Wight 1946). Fieldhouse (1966: 
261-2) comments: “The greater part of the new British Empire has been excluded from 
‘responsible government’ on the principle that non-Europeans could not run a parliamentary 
system, partly because they were uneducated, partly because they were not European.” That said, 
there was considerable variation across the colonies. If, based on the demography of a colony, 
London viewed it as “white man’s country” the colony was likely to be granted a legislature and a 
high degree of self-governance. If, however, there were few white settlers London was likely to 
maintain direct control. Southern Rhodesia, with a sizeable white settler community, followed the 
first route while Kenya, with a much smaller settler community, followed the second (Albertini, 
Wirz 1982: 454, 467). Likewise, rights of political participation for non-Europeans were extended 
quickly in societies with few non-Europeans (e.g., to the Maori in New Zealand), more slowly in 
societies with larger numbers of minorities (e.g., in the United States), and slowest of all in societies 
with majority non-European populations (e.g., Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Caribbean).  
French colonialism featured direct rule, which prohibited self-government. However, 
those colonies with the highest concentrations of French settlers were integrated into the 
metropole as departments with full rights of suffrage and representation – at least, for those with 
French citizenship, which in practice was generally reserved for those with European heritage. 
This was the practice in Algeria (Choi 2016), Cochinchina (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 199), and in the 
four historic communes of Senegal (Johnson 1971). In the latter, whites did not compose a 
majority of the electorate but were nonetheless able to monopolize power through most of the 
colonial period with the assistance of Creole allies (Ibid.). 
Portuguese imperial rule was also highly centralized, and colonists had even less power 
over their own affairs. However, whatever semblance of representation existed – often taking the 
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form of municipal councils (Boxer 1965) – existed primarily for whites (Newitt 1981: 171-74). 
Albertini, Wirz (1982: 422) report that “wherever there was a white colonial population of any size, 
it was organized as a council (concelho), having representative organs and some administrative 
autonomy.” The situation was similar within the small German Empire (Townsend 1966: 277). 
Again, the colony with the most settlers – Southwest Africa – enjoyed the greatest measure of self-
governance (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 411-2). 
Spanish colonies in the New World did not allow for extensive political rights until the 
waning years of the colonial era, though local governments (cabildos) gave representation to those 
who could claim Spanish heritage (Halperin 1981: 51-55, 84-92). Once the heavy hand of the 
Spanish crown was lifted, one finds a strong association between European-ness and early suffrage. 
Within Argentina, Buenos Aires, where European settlers were most heavily concentrated 
(Moya 1998), was the only province to recognize universal male suffrage in 1821 and to maintain 
that practice in subsequent decades (Alonso 1996: 182; Sabato 2001). Across nation-states, 
Argentina, the most European in demographic composition, was the first to adopt universal male 
suffrage (in 1856), preempting other Latin American countries by many decades (though Colombia 
briefly recognized the practice from 1853-1886).4 Likewise, throughout most of the past two 
centuries democracy has been more robust in the European-dominated Southern Cone (Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay) and in the one country in Central America with a large European inheritance 
(Costa Rica).  
In summary, across the colonial and post-colonial eras, one finds few signs of democracy 
anywhere except in the presence of European colonists (Fieldhouse 1966; Reinsch 1906: chs 11-
12; Ward 1976; Wight 1946). This was a product of directives from the metropole as well as 
pressure from the colonies. The latter, of course, became dominant once colonies gained 
independence, but played a role – often a dominant role – throughout the life of a colony. 
Although these two forces sometimes came into conflict with each other with respect to the 
appropriate treatment of non-whites, there was general agreement on the question of democracy. 
Whites (Europeans) were capable of it while non-whites were not. Consequently, the metropole’s 
perspective hinged upon demographic realities on the ground, just as it did for settlers. The logic 
of empire was not so different on this particular point from the logic of independence. 
                                               
4 We do not mean to suggest that Argentina in the nineteenth century was a model democracy. Restrictive 
naturalization procedures disqualified recent immigrants from suffrage and elections were by no means free and fair 
(James 1995). 
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Regression Analyses 
The narrative analysis presented above indicates a strong relationship between European 
demography and democracy during the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods. In the 
following sections, we explore this relationship over a longer period of time and with larger 
samples. 
Our principal measure of regime type is the Electoral democracy (“polyarchy”) index 
developed by Teorell et al. (2018) as part of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project 
(Coppedge et al. 2018). Other measures are employed in subsequent tests to demonstrate 
robustness and to illuminate different dimensions of democracy. To facilitate comparisons, all 
indices are transformed to a 0-100 scale. 
Specifications used in the following analyses vary in order to probe different assumptions 
about the data generating process. A few background variables are treated alternately as potential 
confounders and potential instruments. This follows from our ignorance about the data generating 
process, which so far as we can tell is open to different interpretations. While there is no obviously 
“correct” specification, we believe that there are a limited number of plausible specifications, most 
of which can be tested. To conserve space, detailed descriptions of each variable employed in the 
following analyses are placed in Table E.1 and descriptive statistics in Table E.2. 
Time-periods extend from 1789 to the present. All models include year or decade 
dummies, a convenient way to control for time-effects of no theoretical interest. Standard errors 
are clustered by polity, an important feature given the high degree of temporal auto-correlation.  
We include both colonies and independent countries, wherever possible. However, since 
measures of democracy usually focus on independent states these polities dominate most of our 
samples.  
While most studies of European diffusion focus on the non-European world we include 
Europe in our benchmark sample, motivated by the assumption that whatever factors might be at 
work elsewhere ought to apply to Europe as well. Europe constitutes a small part of the sample 
so its impact on the analysis is not great. To make sure, we construct sub-sample tests focused 
exclusively on the non-European world. 
Initial Analyses 
Table 1 presents an initial set of tests. In Model 1, democracy is regressed against European 
ancestry along with year dummies. In Model 2, we add several geographic covariates that have 
been shown to be strong predictors of democracy and economic development: harbor distance 
(Gerring et al. 2018b) and latitude (La Porta et al. 1998). In Model 3, we add a measure of early 
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(pre-modern) democracy based on data gathered in the Ethnographic Atlas (Giuliano, Nunn 
2013), measures of the share of the population that is Muslim and Protestant, and an index 
measuring the duration of English colonial rule (Olsson 2009). Model 4 includes all previous 
variables along with oil income per capita (Haber, Menaldo 2011), GDP per capita (Farris et al. 
2017), and a vector of nine regional dummies. 
 Coefficient estimates for European ancestry are fairly stable across these specifications and 
t statistics are well above the usual thresholds for statistical significance. Granted, estimates 
attenuate somewhat as covariates are added to the model, and standard errors increase in Model 
4, presumably because of the smaller sample (due to list-wise deletion of missing observations). 
We regard Model 2 as a “spare” benchmark and Model 3 as a “full” benchmark, to be replicated 
in subsequent tests. Model 4 is less satisfactory by virtue of missing data and probable endogeneity 
among the covariates. Note, in particular, that if the presence of Europeans contributes to 
economic development, as many researchers have argued (op. cit.), then per capita GDP must be 
treated as a downstream factor whose inclusion in the model runs the risk of post-treatment bias. 
The variable of theoretical interest, European ancestry, changes slowly through time for 
most countries and is unlikely to be affected by the outcome (democracy). Nonetheless, it is 
important to establish that the findings are robust to different lags of the predictor. In Model 5, 
right-side variables are lagged 100 years behind the outcome. In Model 6, we maintain the 100-
year lag while restricting the outcome to a single year (2000). Note that if European identity was 
more clearly defined and operationalized in historical eras (Section II), one may have more 
confidence in these estimates than in models where right- and left-sides of the model are measured 
contemporaneously. 
 In Model 7, we adopt a fixed-effect approach to estimation, which should help to 
overcome specification problems inherent in cross-sectional analyses. Here, democracy is 
regressed against European ancestry (lagged by two decades) along with country and year 
dummies. This model presents a similar estimate and is highly significant. We regard this as a 
robustness test, not a benchmark model, as changes in European ancestry are infrequent and 
heavily trended and thus less appropriate for a mode of analysis focused entirely upon within-
country variation. 
 Model 8 returns to the “full” specification (Model 3), this time with standardized 
coefficients (and unclustered standard errors). The goal here is to compare, albeit in a somewhat 
arbitrary fashion, the impact of various factors on democracy. We are especially interested in 
alternate paths of long-term diffusion from Europe, namely Protestantism and English colonial 
rule – both of which have garnered a great deal of attention from scholars (op. cit.). It will be seen 
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that a one-standard deviation change in European ancestry has a much larger apparent impact on 
regime type than either of these alternate pathways. It should also be noted that neither pathway 
is robust (at standard thresholds of statistical significance) in previous tests shown in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Initial Analyses 
Lag (years) 0 0 0 0 100 100 20 0 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
European ancestry 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.21*** 0.11** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.25** 0.31*** 
   (%) (11.99) (6.92) (5.00) (2.50) (3.73) (3.40) (2.00) (45.00) 
Harbor distance  -9.15e-3*** -6.35e-3** -2.56e-3 -0.01* -0.01**  -0.08*** 
  (-3.26) (-2.52) (-0.83) (-1.93) (-2.08)  (-14.97) 
Latitude  21.68*** 15.96*** -2.56 6.53 7.14  0.11*** 
      (3.05) (2.84) (-0.29) (0.59) (0.46)  (19.06) 
Early democracy   6.09** 7.50** 10.36** 8.67  0.10*** 
   (2.15) (2.47) (2.29) (1.54)  (17.76) 
Protestant (%)   0.20*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.11  0.17*** 
       (3.31) (3.31) (3.09) (1.13)  (29.18) 
Muslim (%)   -0.12*** -0.07 -0.16*** -0.25***  -0.15*** 
   (-5.30) (-1.44) (-4.59) (-4.07)  (-29.40) 
English colonial    6.68e-3 4.63e-3 0.01 2.36e-3  0.04*** 
   duration   (0.84) (0.55) (1.07) (0.21)  (7.41) 
Oil income per cap    -1.21e-3***     
    (-5.13)     
GDP per cap (ln)    9.68***     
    (6.70)     
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies    ✓     
Country dummies       ✓  
Countries 180 174 166 159 132 125 180 166 
Years 1789-2017 1789-2009 1789-2009 1800-2006 1789-1917 2000 1770-1997 1789-2009 
N 23,106 18,185 17,586 12,454 8,375 125 23,108 17,586 
R2 .5524 .5588 .6233 .6291 .6017 .5482 .5166 .6233 
Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale.  Ordinary least squares 
regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors – except Model 8, which employs standardized 
coefficients and unclustered standard errors.  ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10   
 
 
 To get a sense for what the coefficient estimates for European ancestry might mean in the 
real world, we estimate predicted values for democracy as the share of Europeans changes based 
on the spare benchmark specification. These estimates, surrounded by 95% confidence intervals, 
are shown in Figure 2. It will be seen that a country whose share of Europeans increases from 0 
to 100 is estimated to gain about 35 points on our 100-point index of democracy. 
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Figure 2:  Predicted Values from Benchmark Model 
 
Predicted values of democracy (measured by the Polyarchy index) as European ancestry changes, 
based on estimates from Model 2, Table 1, with covariates set at their sample means. The gray area 
surrounding the point estimate corresponds to the 95% confidence interval 
Temporal Relationships 
To explore how the relationship between European ancestry and democracy might change over 
time we execute a series of rolling regressions. Here, the sample is restricted to a 30-year moving 
window starting in 1800 and continuing to the end of the period. As an outcome measure we 
employ the Lexical index of electoral democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015), whose coverage is superior 
to Polyarchy and thus more representative of the population of interest. We again adopt a spare 
specification, including only geographic covariates and annual dummies.  
Figure 3 graphs the coefficients for European ancestry over time, showing that the 
relationship peaks, as hypothesized, in the twentieth century, with a dip in the interwar years 
(corresponding to the breakdown of democracy in continental Europe), a recovery in the postwar 
years, and a steep decline at the end of the century during the third wave of democratization.  
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Figure 3:  Rolling Regressions 
 
 
Rolling regressions in which the Lexical index of electoral democracy is regressed against 
European ancestry, geographic covariates (latitude and harbor distance), and annual dummies in a 
moving 30-year window. Coefficients for European ancestry, flanked by 95% confidence intervals, 
are graphed for each year (the end-point of each 30-year window).  
Alternate Measures of Democracy 
In Table 2, we test alternate measures of democracy. This includes a few composite indices along 
with measures intended to capture particular dimensions of democracy. A secondary objective is 
to expand the time-horizons of the analyses so as to include colonies and semi-sovereign countries, 
which we attempt to follow back to the late eighteenth century. For each outcome, we test two 
specifications (based on the spare and full models in Table 1). 
 Models 1-2 in Table 2 focus on male suffrage, the approximate percentage of enfranchised 
male adults older than the minimal voting age, as measured by V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018) for 
the twentieth century and by Bilinski (2015) for the nineteenth century. These analyses are 
restricted to years prior to 1920, when there was considerable variation in suffrage laws. 
Models 3-4 focus on the presence of elections based on the V-Dem electoral regime index, 
which measures whether regularly scheduled national elections are on course, as stipulated by 
election law or well-established precedent (Coppedge et al. 2018). Where possible, we extend this 
variable to cover colonies in the nineteenth century.  
Models 5-6 focus on electoral contestation as measured by a contestation index developed 
by Gerring et al. (2018a). For each year, a polity receives a score calculated as the incumbent share 
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of votes in national elections (parliamentary and/or presidential) minus the share received by the 
largest challenger, subtracted from 100. A score of zero is assigned if there are no elective offices 
at the national level or if elections are interrupted. 
Models 7-8 utilize the Lexical index of electoral democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015). Models 
9-10 focus on the wellknown Polity2 index from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers 2016).  
Estimation is by ordinary least squares except Models 5-6, which utilize a tobit model 
appropriate for outcomes that are bounded at zero. Year dummies are included in all models 
except Models 5-6, where they are replaced by decade dummies. 
 These tests show a strong and robust relationship between European ancestry and 
democracy. Indeed, virtually all coefficient estimates are higher than those estimated with the 
Polyarchy index (Table 1). Again, we find non-robust results for alternate measures of European 
diffusion – Protestantism and English colonialism. 
Table 2:  Alternate Measures of Democracy 
Outcome Male Suffrage Elections Contestation Lexical index Polity2 
Estimator OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
European  0.32*** 0.27*** 0.49*** 0.38*** 0.46*** 0.33*** 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.20*** 
    ancestry (%) (4.24) (3.22) (8.59) (6.20) (7.75) (5.39) (7.74) (5.29) (5.05) (3.00) 
Harbor distance -0.02** -0.02** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01** 
 (-2.69) (-2.53) (-3.30) (-2.41) (-3.66) (-2.29) (-3.84) (-2.90) (-3.22) (-2.50) 
Latitude 3.05 10.79 20.07* 26.06*** 20.60* 21.39** 17.55* 17.88** 11.24 2.57 
 (0.21) (0.70) (1.86) (2.52) (1.80) (2.07) (1.88) (2.20) (0.98) (0.26) 
Early democracy  -1.66  1.27  5.45  5.19  8.26 
  (-0.30)  (0.28)  (1.24)  (1.43)  (1.56) 
Protestant (%)  4.06e-3  0.09  0.08  0.14*  0.22** 
      (0.03)  (1.19)  (1.11)  (1.80)  (2.15) 
Muslim (%)  -0.29***  -0.21***  -0.27***  -0.18***  -0.22*** 
  (-4.41)  (-4.61)  (-5.29)  (-5.70)  (-4.83) 
English colonial   -0.02***  0.01  0.01*  0.01  0.03* 
   duration  (-2.79)  (0.93)  (1.85)  (1.69)  (1.74) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Decade 
Dummies     ✓ ✓     
Countries 140 132 191 180 191 180 191 180 168 160 
Years 1789-1919 1789-2009 1800-2009 1789-2009 1800-2009 
N 4,518 4,380 25,176 23,734 21,698 20,496 23,348 22,026 13,780 13,349 
R2 .3592 .4271 .4293 .4459 .1366 .1456 .5404 .5710 .3227 .4088 
Outcome: democracy, measured in various ways and transformed to a 0-100 scale (with the exception of Elections, 
which is binary).  Estimators: as indicated, t statistics in parentheses, clustered standard errors.  ***p<.01 **p<.05 
*p<.10   
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Sub-Sample Analyses 
In Table 3 we explore various sample restrictions. Models 1-2 are limited to non-European cases. 
Here, the causal factor of interest can operate only by diffusion. Model 1 adopts the full 
specification while Model 2 adds several additional variables intended to measure stateness, which 
may serve as an impediment to European conquest – and also, perhaps, to democratization (Hariri 
2012).  
The next tests focus on the distribution of the data for European ancestry. Recall that this 
distribution is bimodal (Figure 1), so it is important to establish that our results are not contingent 
upon a set of extreme cases. Model 3 is restricted to cases where Europeans composed less than 
eighty percent of the population, eliminating Europe as well as neo-Europes in the New World 
from the sample. Model 4 is restricted to cases where Europeans composed greater than ten 
percent of the population, eliminating cases (many of them in Asia and Africa) where Europeans 
were a slight presence.  
The final set of tests focus on colonizers with largest numbers of ex-colonies: Britain 
(Model 5), France (Model 6), and Spain (Model 7). These are important comparisons since they 
hold constant the colonizer – and also, to some extent, the period of colonization and the regions 
of the world that were colonized. (British colonization spanned the centuries and most parts of 
the world, while Spanish and French colonization was somewhat more focused.) 
Estimates for European ancestry from all tests in Table 3 are robust and comparable to 
(indeed, somewhat stronger) than the corresponding benchmark models in Table 1. Although 
standard errors are reduced wherever there is a significant reduction in sample size, t statistics 
surpass usual thresholds of statistical significance.  
In additional tests we remove each region of the world, seriatim. The relationship between 
European ancestry and democracy is remarkably stable in these sub-sample tests, as shown in 
Table F.1. 
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Table 3:  Sample Restrictions 
Sample 
Non- 
European 
polities 
Non- 
European 
polities 
European 
ancestry 
<80% 
European 
ancestry 
>10% 
British 
hegemony 
French 
hegemony 
Spanish 
hegemony 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
European ancestry 
(%) 0.29*** 0.46*** 0.34*** 0.26*** 0.52*** 0.41*** 0.37*** 
 (5.05) (7.27) (4.97) (3.22) (4.98) (9.06) (3.33) 
Harbor distance -0.01*** 0.01** -0.01*** 0.01 1.58e-3 -2.08e-3 0.02* 
 (-2.82) (-2.69) (-3.32) (0.93) (0.30) (-0.60) (1.92) 
Latitude  13.16** -3.25 21.72*** -10.39 -2.90 18.71 -36.11 
 (2.42) (-0.34) (4.13) (-0.74) (-0.19) (1.05) (-1.51) 
Early democracy 6.77** 3.60 7.99*** 5.55 -2.38 -0.86 1.44 
 (2.57) (1.04) (2.98) (0.92) (-0.40) (-0.20) (0.11) 
Protestant (%) 0.21** 0.19 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.09 0.17 0.13 
     (2.62) (1.60) (4.04) (3.02) (0.97) (1.58) (0.36) 
Muslim (%) -0.10*** -0.08* -0.09*** -0.17** -0.13** -0.01 2.01*** 
 (-4.08) (-1.84) (-3.98) (-2.10) (-2.40) (-0.37) (3.36) 
English colonial  0.02 0.02* 0.01 7.66e-3    
   Duration (1.58) (1.60) (1.22) (0.88)    
State history  10.97**      
  (2.01)      
State formation, years  -0.38      
   since (ln)  (-0.58)      
Independence, years  -0.42      
   since (ln)  (-0.83)      
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Countries 146 86 148 44 49 28 21 
Years 1789-2009 1830-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 
N 14,430 9,934 14,232 6,491 4,966 2,922 3,198 
R2 .5658 .6533 .5576 .6611 .6828 .7032 .5763 
Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale.  Ordinary least squares 
regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors.  ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10   
 
Instrumental Variable Analysis 
In Table 4, we take a different approach to the problem of causal identification, modeling 
assignment to treatment with exogenous instruments. These analyses are limited to non-European 
cases, as the instrument attempts to model the spread of Europeans beyond Europe. 
As a principal instrument we rely on population density in 1500, which served as a barrier to 
European migration and – more importantly – to demographic dominance, as discussed in Section 
I. Model 1 offers a minimal specification with only the IV and decade dummies. Model 2 adds 
geographic covariates. Model 3 adds additional covariates, following the full specification in Table 
1 with the addition of pre-colonial state history (drawn from Putterman, Weil 2010) and years since 
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independence (a proxy measure of stateness). Estimates for European ancestry are robust across all 
three models and consistent with the corresponding benchmark models in Table 1.  
In common with all non-randomized instruments, it is impossible to verify the 
assumptions underlying our IV analysis. Nonetheless, it is plausible to suppose that the exclusion 
restriction has been satisfied conditional on observed covariates. Note that population density may 
proxy for state strength, which could also serve as a deterrent to European influence (Hariri 2012) 
and to democratization (Andersen et al. 2014). With this confounder in mind, we condition on 
two factors intended to measure state strength in Model 3. 
Reassuringly, other possible instruments show similar results. In Appendix F, we replicate 
Model 2 with a variety of other geographic or pre-modern historical variables commonly viewed 
as influences on European settlement – distance from London (squared), settler mortality, malaria, 
years since agricultural transition, and state history. The relationship between European ancestry 
is robust with each of these alternate instruments, as shown in Table F.2. No matter what 
instrument is chosen, European ancestry predicts higher levels of democracy. While assumptions 
required for any single model may be questioned, the aggregate set of results seems to offer strong 
support for our thesis. 
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Table 4:  Instrumental Variable Analysis 
Models 1 2 3 
Estimator OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
European ancestry (%)  0.32**  0.37***  0.32** 
  (2.06)  (2.95)  (2.23) 
Population density, 1500 
(ln) -7.83***  -8.76***  -7.59***  
      (-4.02)  (-5.16)  (-4.79)  
Harbor distance   -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
   (-4.18) (-2.51) (-2.37) (-2.45) 
Latitude    31.05** 17.03* 47.41*** 14.31 
   (2.22) (1.91) (3.08) (0.92) 
Independence, years since 
(ln)     2.96*** -0.20 
     (3.28) (-0.31) 
State history     -15.30** 2.36 
     (-2.18) (0.32) 
Early democracy     5.35 8.14 
     (0.93) (1.71) 
Protestant (%)     -0.05 0.08 
     (-0.21) (0.56) 
Muslim (%)     -0.10** -0.11** 
     (-2.15) (-2.10) 
English colonial duration     2.97e-3 0.02 
     (0.25) (1.52) 
Decade dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Countries 128 128 78 
Years 1800-2009 1800-2009 1800-2009 
N 11,921 10,626 7,310 
R2 .2468 .4661 .3851 .4926 .6534 .6216 
Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale.  Samples: non-European cases.  
Estimator: two-stage least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors.  ***p<.01 
**p<.05 *p<.10   
 
IV. Conclusions 
As a form of governance at the state level democracy was a European innovation. It spread to the 
rest of the world during the colonial era, leaving a legacy that persists (in attenuating form) to the 
present day. In that racialized era, we argue that political outcomes depended upon a numbers 
game. The greater the ratio of Europeans to non-Europeans, the greater the likelihood that the 
latter would be granted full (or at least partial) political rights and the greater the likelihood that a 
democratic system of rule would materialize. We have shown that similar patterns obtained across 
colonies, across regions within countries, across countries, and through time. 
We conjecture that this is because Europeans viewed democracy as a basic right – for 
themselves. It was a club good. Hence, where Europeans were in the majority they were democrats. 
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Where they were not they were indifferent or hostile, or they embraced a restricted form of 
democracy that excluded non-Europeans. 
We argue that this demographic relationship peaked in the twentieth century and declined 
thereafter as a result of waning European power and prestige, the global diffusion of the 
democratic ideal, and the blurring or obsolescence of racial identities. If current trends continue 
(see Figure 3), regime outcomes may have little to do with European demography in the coming 
century. 
This argument is relevant to ongoing work on the long-term diffusion of European ideas 
and institutions. Specifically, our analyses suggest that demography may be a stronger, more robust 
predictor of democracy than other potential pathways from Europe such as religion and 
colonialism. (Alternative accounts and alternative measures are explored in greater detail in 
Appendix G.) 
Our argument is also relevant to ongoing work on the intersection of race and liberalism 
(Centeno 2007; FitzGerald, Cook-Martin 2014; Horton 2005; Rana 2011; Smith 1997). We have 
shown that the spread of democratic norms coincided with, and to some extent presumed, the 
norm of racial exclusion. 
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Appendix B:  European Ancestry, Territory Graphs 
This appendix includes data on European ancestry (as described in the text) for 237 territories that 
enjoyed some degree of self-rule (not necessarily formal independence) at some point from 1600 
to the present. Note that these territories are excluded from analyses if there is no corresponding 
data for the outcome of interest, democracy. This means that data points for years prior to 1789 
and for many non-sovereign territories and micro-states are excluded. Note also that territory 
names used in the following graphs are those currently attached to these entities. Many territories 
have historic names that we do not reproduce here.  
 
Territories here are defined according to modern boundaries. Every effort was made to match 
historical definitions of countries and territories from the original sources to these modern 
definitions. In cases where multiple territories were combined into a single country, population 
estimates (both European and total) were also combined. In cases where a single territory was split 
into multiple countries, the calculated European ancestry (European population as a percentage 
of total population calculated prior to smoothing) was duplicated for each resulting territory. In a 
handful of cases where modern boundaries were not the result of either a join or split, it was 
necessary to both aggregate and split. 
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Table B1: Source Key 
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Albertini & Wirz (1982: 428) 6 
Alesina et al. (2003) 7 
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Belich (2009: 28) 12 
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CIA World Factbook 15 
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Curtin et al (1995: 293) 18 
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numbers, which were constructed by John Galindo for the Royal Geographical 
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of whites was too high. 23 
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Appendix C:  European Ancestry, Maps 
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Appendix D:  European Ancestry, Convergent Validity 
Tests 
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Table D.1:  Correlations among Indices 
Alternate index Years Countries Obs Pearson’s r correlation 
Included 
in European  
Ancestry 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001 1900 157 157 0.66 N 
Easterly, Levine 2016 1600-1800 12 132 0.74 Y 
Easterly, Levine 2016 1800-1900 32 3232 0.84 Y 
Putterman, Weil 2010 2000 164 164 0.86 N 
Pearson’s r correlation of European ancestry (authors) with alternate indices, focusing on the year(s) in which the 
alternate index is measured. 
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Appendix E:  Data Description 
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Table E.1:  Variable Descriptions 
Agricultural Transition. Estimated years in thousands since the transition to an agricultural society. Source: 
Woodberry (2012). agritran 
Biogeography. Measure of availability of storable crops and domesticated animals during the prehistoric 
era. Source: Easterly, Levine (2016) drawing on Hibbs, Olsson (2004). Scale: interval. biogeography 
Contestation. Incumbent-challenger formula of electoral contestation, calculated as the incumbent (the 
party with the largest share of votes in the previous election) share of votes in a national legislative or 
presidential election minus the share of the largest challenger, subtracted from 100.  Source: Gerring et al. 
(2018a).  Scale: interval.  inc_chall_combined 
Distance to London. Distance in kilometers (logged) from country capital to London. Source: Gleditsch 
(2002). dist_to_london_km_ln 
Early democracy. A measure of early democratic characteristics in societies prior to the arrival of 
Europeans. The variable is calculated by the authors as the sum of the values of two variables: “election or 
other formal consensus” and “informal consensus.” Source: Giuliano, Nunn (2013) drawing on Murdock 
(1967).  Scale: interval.  murdock_dem 
Elections.  The electoral regime index (v2x_elereg) is coded 1 from when there was a presidential or 
parliamentary election, if it was not aborted, until there was an interruption through the executive or 
legislature. An electoral interruption is i) an event that dissolves, replaces, or otherwise terminates an elected 
body executive or parliament or ii) an event that implies that the elected body, while still intact, will not be 
subject to election in the future. Typically, an interruption is the product of a coup, declared state of 
emergency, or military defeat. After an interruption, a coding of 0 continues until another election occurs. 
An executive and a legislative electoral regime cannot be separated since they form an integral part, where 
an aborted legislature is interpreted as a signal that also the executive is not standing for election any longer, 
and vice versa. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016), supplemented by the authors.  Scale: binary.  
v2x_elecreg_jg 
English colonial duration.  Number of years of English colonial rule. Source: Olsson (2009), supplemented 
by the authors. Scale: interval.  durbritain_new 
European ancestry. European share of the population as calculated by the authors based on multiple 
sources. For territories outside continental Europe, we mark the date of the first recorded European 
settlement or (if the latter is unknown) the first European contact (discovery). This is coded as zero (no 
Europeans), forming the first data point in the series. For territories within continental Europe, we record 
the number of Europeans as 100% in 1950. This estimate is extended back to 1789. For the remaining 
time-period (after the point of first European contact for non-European territories and after 1950 for 
European territories), we use a quadratic function to estimate yearly data points across available data points. 
Source: see Appendix A. Scale: interval.  eur_pct_est_smooth 
European ancestry, Easterly, Levine. European share of the population.  Source: Easterly, Levine (2016). 
Scale: interval.  euro1900 
European ancestry, Putterman, Weil. European share of the population.  Source: Putterman and Weil 
(2010).  Scale: interval.  pct_eur_ancestors 
European colonial duration.  Number of years of European colonial rule. Source: Olsson (2009).  Scale: 
interval.  duration_global 
Early state history (pre-1500). State antiquities index up to 1500. Source: Brockstette and Putterman (2007) 
provided in dataset from Hariri (2012). statehist_pre1500 
Early state history (pre-1750). State antiquities index up to 1750. Source: Brockstette and Putterman (2007) 
provided in dataset from Hariri (2012). statehist_pre1750 
GDP per cap.  Gross domestic product per capita in constant 1990 dollars, based on data from the 
Maddison Project (Bolt, van Zanden 2014), supplemented by estimates from Bairoch (1976), Broadberry 
(2015), Broadberry/Klein (2012), Gleditsch (2002), and the WDI (World Bank 2016), which are combined 
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in a dynamic, three-dimensional latent trait model. Source: Fariss et al. (2017).  Scale: logarithmic.  
Maddison_gdppc_1990_estimate_ln 
Harbor distance. Mean distance in kilometers within a territory to the nearest natural harbor. Natural 
harbors are considered one of four types (coastal natural, river natural, river basin, or lake/canal) as defined 
by the World Ports Index (NGIA 2017). Source: Gerring et al. (2018b). Scale: interval. portidst_natural_km 
Indigenous mortality. Binary variable indicating high rates of indigenous mortality from European 
diseases. Source: Easterly, Levine (2016) drawing on McEvedy, Jones (1978), McNeil (1976), Karlen (1995), 
Oldstone (1998). Scale: binary. el_indigmort 
Indirect rule. Ratio of colonially recognized court cases to all court cases in 1955. Source: Lange (2004), 
extended by Hariri (2012).  Scale: interval.  indirect_rule 
Inequality. Distribution of income expressed as a Gini coefficient (aka Gini index, Gini ratio). Missing 
data is imputed, as follows, using linear models (a reasonable imputation procedure in this instance given 
the stickiness of the variable of interest). Step 1: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated. Step 2: 
Missing data from the last recorded data point to 2012 (less than a decade in all cases) is filled by repeating 
the last observation. Measure is based on data from UNU-WIDER (2017). Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 
2016). Scale: interval. e_peginiwi 
Latitude. The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 
1). Source: La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1997). Scale: interval. lp_lat_abst 
Lexical index of electoral democracy.  An ordinal index measuring the electoral components of 
democracy in a cumulative fashion. That is, to qualify for a given level (0-6) all previous conditions must 
be satisfied.  0 = No elections. (Elections are not held for any policymaking offices. This includes situations 
in which elections are postponed indefinitely or the constitutional timing of elections is violated in a more 
than marginal fashion.)  1 = Elections with no parties or only one party. (There are regular elections but 
they are non-partisan or only a single party or party grouping is allowed to participate.)  2 = Multi-party 
elections for legislature. (Opposition parties are allowed to participate in legislative elections and to take 
office.)  3 = Multi-party elections for executive. (The executive is chosen directly or indirectly – by an 
elected legislature – through elections.  4 = Minimally competitive elections for both executive and 
legislature. (The chief executive offices and the seats in the effective legislative body are – directly or 
indirectly – filled by elections characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, 
sufficiently free to enable the opposition to win government power.)  5 = Male or female suffrage. (Virtually 
all adult male or female citizens are allowed to vote in elections.)  6 = Universal suffrage. (Virtually all adult 
citizens are allowed to vote in elections.)  Source: Skaaning et al. (2015) and extended by the authors.  Scale: 
ordinal.  lexical_index 
Malaria ecology. Measure of the stability of malarial transmission in a given territory. Source: Easterly, 
Levine (2016), drawing on Kiszewski et al. (2004). Scale: interval. el_ME 
Male suffrage. A measure that covers de facto enfranchised adults and not de jure. For example, the scores 
reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted, male 
suffrage may still be 100. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) and extended by the authors with data from 
Bilinski (2015). Scale: interval. v2msuffrage_JG 
Muslim.  Share of population that is muslim by heritage (%).  Source: authors.  Scale: interval.  Muslim 
Neolithic transition. Years prior to 2000 in which Neolithic transition is estimated to have occurred. 
Source: Putterman and Trainor (2006) as provided by Hariri (2012). agri_transition 
Oil income per capita. The aggregated real value of a country’s petroleum production, as a share of total 
population.  Source: Haber, Menaldo (2011).  Scale: interval.  e_Total_Oil_Income_PC 
Polity2.  A weighted additive aggregation procedure across five sub-components: competitiveness and 
openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness and regulation of political participation, and constraints 
on the chief executive.  Source: Polity IV database (Marshall, Jaggers 2016).  Scale: ordinal.  e_polity2 
Polyarchy.  Electoral democracy index.  Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018; Teorell et al. 2018).  Scale: 
interval.  v2x_polyarchy 
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Population density, 1500.  Source: Michalopoulos (2012), drawing on McEvedy, Jones (1978). 
Precious metals. Binary variable indicating if a given country produced any silver or gold in 1999. 
Originally reported in Easterly (2007). Source: Easterly, Levine (2016). Scale: binary. el_gold_silver 
Protestant. Percentage of population belonging to a Protestant Christian denomination. To complete the 
time series, countries were assigned a value of 0 in the year prior to the arrival of the first Christian 
missionaries and then filled using linear interpolation. Observed data points come from the Correlates of 
War Project (Maoz 2013) and Woodberry (2012). Source: Calculated by authors. Scale: interval. chrstprotpct 
Regions.  A vector of dummies: Europe (Western and Eastern), America, Caribbean, MENA, sub-Saharan Africa, 
East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, Pacific.  Source: Authors.  Scale: nominal.  e_regionpol2 
Settler mortality. Historical deaths per 1000 European settlers per year. Originally reported in Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinsin (2001). Source: Easterly, Levine (2016). Scale: interval. el_settlermort 
Soil suitability. Measure of the suitability of soil for agriculture based on soil carbon density and pH. 
Originally reported in Ashraf and Galor (2013). Source: Easterly, Levine (2016). Scale: interval. el_soilsuit 
State history. History of stateness calculated at 100-intervals from 0 AD to the present with one percent 
depreciation rate. Source: Bockstette, Chanda, Putterman (2002). Statehistn01 
Year. Calendar year. 
Years since independence. Number of years since independence (de facto or de jure) or 1000 (whichever 
comes later). Source: Calculated by authors. Scale: Logarithmic. indep_yrs_since_ln 
Years since state formation  Number of years since state formation.  Source: authors. Scale: logarithmic.  
state_early_yrs_since_ln  
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Table E.2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
European ancestry 54,271 17.48 32.96 0.00 100.00 
Polyarchy 24,002 26.53 26.22 0.73 94.00 
Harbor distance 26,137 322.56 302.55 4.13 1986.00 
Latitude 44,047 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.72 
Early democracy 44,306 0.26 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Protestant 42,618 9.22 19.00 0.00 99.01 
Muslim 43,848 23.29 35.98 0.00 99.90 
English colonial duration 55,288 65.85 148.05 0.00 952.00 
Oil income per capita 14,729 343.04 2645.72 0.00 78588.80 
GDP per capita 27,306 7.61 1.14 3.87 14.40 
Region 45,698 4.49 2.63 1.00 10.00 
Male suffrage 21,171 51.71 48.64 0.00 100.00 
Elections 40,645 40.19 49.03 0.00 100.00 
Contestation 35,814 11.93 20.29 0.00 100.00 
Lexical 37,441 22.51 35.88 0.00 100.00 
Polity 2 16,427 47.75 35.51 0.00 100.00 
State history 19,234 0.38 0.28 0.01 0.98 
Years since state formation 44,312 1.82 2.33 0.00 7.72 
Years since independence 43,111 1.57 2.26 0.00 7.57 
Population density, 1500 16,611 0.91 1.49 -3.82 3.84 
Settler mortality 17,787 4.70 1.17 2.15 7.99 
Malaria ecology 25,320 5.04 7.22 0.00 31.55 
Indigenous mortality 27,710 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Soil suitability 23,795 0.53 0.19 0.16 0.95 
Precious metals 27,710 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Biogegraphy 18,453 -0.01 1.31 -1.02 3.79 
Inequality 7,366 40.67 10.23 15.90 74.30 
European ancestry, Easterly, Levine 36,424 28.29 40.91 0.00 100.00 
European ancestry, Putterman, Weil 38,150 0.21 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Distance to London 44,418 8.40 1.03 0.00 9.84 
Agricultural transition 33,869 4,85 2,36 0.4 10.5 
  
 
113 
 
Appendix F:  Robustness Tests  
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Table F.1:  Excluding Regions 
Excluded region Americas MENA Sub-Saharan Africa Europe East Asia 
South-East 
Asia South Asia Pacific Caribbean 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
European  0.29*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.42*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
    ancestry (%) (5.46) (5.92) (6.48) (7.92) (6.74) (6.83) (6.87) (6.94) (6.98) 
Harbor distance -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01** -4.97e-3* -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01** 
 (-3.30) (-4.44) (-2.45) (-1.91) (-3.01) (-3.21) (-2.96) (-3.11) (-2.82) 
Latitude 27.26*** 25.74*** 19.72** 2.42 21.71*** 21.50*** 22.90*** 21.95*** 23.20*** 
 (3.39) (3.55) (2.33) (0.29) (2.93) (3.02) (-2.96) (3.07) (3.22) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Countries 152 153 126 125 168 163 166 170 169 
Years 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 
N 14,596 15,996 13,908 13,494 17,477 17,127 17,348 17,780 17,754 
R2 .5599 .5806 .5406 .5144 .5646 .5581 .5652 .5598 .5651 
Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale.  Ordinary least squares 
regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors.  ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10   
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Table F.2:  Alternate Instruments 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 
Estimator OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
European ancestry (%)  0.56***  0.82***  0.56*  0.61***  0.42*** 
  (3.95)  (5.13)  (1.70)  (3.69)  (4.00) 
Distance to London  199.38          
     (ln, squared) (1.57)          
Settler mortality   -7.13***        
   (-2.90)        
Malaria transmission     -0.36*      
     (-1.66)      
Agricultural transition        -3.45***    
       (-3.27)    
State history         -43.74***  
         (-4.74)  
Harbor distance -0.01** -4.87e-3 -0.01* -2.04e-3 -0.01** -2.99e-3 -0.01*** -3.82e-3 -0.01** -0.01*** 
 (-2.20) (-1.53) (-1.59) (-0.43) (-2.37) (-0.49) (-3.01) (-0.98) (-2.03) (-2.87) 
Latitude 64.22*** 3.64 74.79** -39.06 54.37* -5.89 53.28** 2.39 93.03*** 5.46 
 (2.85) (0.37) (2.73) (-1.83) (1.87) (0.26) (2.59) (0.22) (4.35) (0.52) 
Decade dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Countries 150 77 111 128 86 
Years 1800-2009 1800-2009 1800-2009 1800-2009 1800-2009 
N 14,790 8,964 12,288 12,849 9,989 
R2 .2455 .4589 .3927 .5082 .2134 .5221 .2332 .4511 .4135 .6054 
Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale.  Samples: non-European cases.  Estimator: two-stage least squares regression, t 
statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors.  ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10   
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Appendix G:  Alternative Accounts 
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Having set forth a European-ancestry account of democratization it is time to consider several 
alternatives. 
 In attempts to explain long-run economic development political institutions often play an 
intermediary role. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (“AJR” 2001, 2002) argue that the 
contribution of Europeans to economic development operates through “good institutions,” 
operationalized with an indicator of property rights measured in the late-twentieth century. This 
argument runs parallel to our own, but is conceptually (and empirically) distinct. 
 A second argument hinges upon labor supply. Engerman, Sokoff (2012: ch 4) distinguish 
between labor-poor and labor-rich societies, arguing that in the former political institutions are apt 
to be more inclusive so as to attract migrants. It seems evident that in some settings governments 
grant suffrage and other political and civil rights and landowners offer enhanced wages in order to 
encourage immigration. However, in other settings labor scarcity is dealt with by restricting labor 
mobility (serfdom) or forced migration (slavery). Divergent experiences may be found in Europe 
after the Black Death (where Western Europe followed the a liberalizing strategy and Eastern 
Europe a coercive strategy [Engerman 2014: 37]) and in the Americas during the 17th-19th centuries 
(where labor-poor areas away from the equator followed a liberalizing strategy and labor-poor 
areas near the equator followed a coercive strategy). This seems to be a case of extreme causal 
heterogeneity, where – due to some unidentified moderator – a single causal factor has contrary 
effects. In any case, we find no discernible relationship between population density and democracy 
when tested in a crossnational sample (results available upon request). 
A third issue concerns the role of geography in conditioning global migration and mortality 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly, Levine 2016; Engerman, Sokoloff 2012; 
Glaeser et al. 2004; Mahoney 2010; Putterman, Weil 2010). These factors are featured in our 
theoretical account (Section I) and represented in our empirical models by latitude, harbor distance, 
and a vector of regional dummies (Table 1). However, “geography” is a complex of causes and 
there are many ways it might affect the variables of theoretical interest, perhaps serving as a 
confounder.  
To mitigate this concern we include a battery of additional factors in tests shown in Table 
G.1. These include settler mortality, malaria ecology, indigenous mortality, soil suitability, precious 
metals, and biogeography. We also test inequality (proxied by the gini coefficient of income 
inequality), which appears as a key intermediary variable in many accounts of long-term 
development (e.g., Engerman, Sokoloff 2012). Results demonstrate that few of these factors has 
an appreciable impact on the outcome of interest in the full specification. More important, for 
present purposes, these covariates do not attenuate the estimated effect of European ancestry on 
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democracy. Thus, although we cannot discount the possibility that some unmeasured geographic 
factor might serve as a confounder, we cannot readily identify what this factor might be. 
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Table G.1:  Geography and Inequality 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
European ancestry (%) 0.43*** 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 0.24*** 
    (8.12) (6.60) (4.75) (6.24) (6.24) (6.46) (4.27) 
Harbor distance -5.18e-3* -4.66e-3 -3.15e-3 -2.93e-3 -4.43e-3 -5.30e-3** -0.01*** 
 (-2.12) (-1.73) (-1.21) (-1.08) (-1.80) (-1.98) (-3.03) 
Latitude -10.19 4.52 6.92 -0.74 0.39 6.09 22.29** 
 (-1.31) (0.49) (0.82) (0.08) (0.05) (0.56) (2.47) 
Early democracy -1.86 4.18 5.41* 5.19* 3.90 2.00 9.29** 
 (-0.71) (1.42) (1.84) (1.66) (1.46) (0.56) (2.18) 
Protestant (%) 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.22* 0.17** 
     (2.89) (2.75) (2.69) (2.64) (3.15) (1.99) (2.60) 
Muslim (%) -0.01 -0.06** -0.05 -0.04 -0.06** -0.04 -0.15*** 
 (-0.37) (-2.10) (-1.63) (-0.98) (-2.13) (-1.10) (-3.28) 
English colonial duration 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (1.41) (1.23) (1.16) (1.04) (0.90) (1.21) (1.35) 
Settler mortality -1.51       
 (-1.56)       
Malaria ecology  0.01      
  (0.09)      
Indigenous mortality   5.56**     
   (2.48)     
Soil suitability    9.20    
    (1.35)    
Precious metals     4.97***   
     (2.79)   
Biogeography      0.42  
      (0.45)  
Inequality       0.02 
       (0.12) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Countries 77 110 113 105 113 81 154 
Years 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1789-2009 1900-2009 
N 8,978 12,210 12,504 11,744 12,504 9,451 5,800 
R2 .6955 .6157 .6224 .6156 .6266 .6674 .5558 
Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to 0-100 scale.  Estimator: ordinary least squares 
regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors.  ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10   
 
 
A final issue to consider are the many and various alternate pathways from Europe to the 
world that might have served to diffuse concepts and practices of democracy. We argue that the 
demographic pathway was more potent than other potential pathways including those based on 
religion (Protestantism) or colonial control (British). We choose British colonial duration because 
this variable out-performs other measures of colonialism in tests conducted by Olsson (2009). We 
choose Protestants as share of the population because this variable, unlike others provided by 
Woodberry (2012), is measurable across the period of observation and across the world (not 
merely outside Europe), and hence is congruent with our research design. We supplement coding 
of both of these variables so as to be testable across a global sample that extends back to 1789 (see 
variable descriptions in Table E.1). Importantly, the differential performance of these factors 
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remains in narrower tests, e.g., when the sample is restricted to the non-European world (Table 3) 
or when the outcome is measured only in the contemporary era (Model 6, Table 1).  
Granted, these complex causal factors might be operationalized differently. To further 
probe alternate pathways from Europe we conduct additional tests focused on other variables 
drawn from recent work on these subjects. This includes an indicator of colonial rule that measures 
the duration of colonial control for all European powers, not just England (Olsson 2009), and a 
measure of indirect rule constructed by Lange (2004) and extended by Hariri (2012). 
For each variable, we adopt two specifications – one based on Model 2, Table 1, and the 
other based on Model 4, Table 1 (excluding Protestantism and British colonial rule so as to avoid 
problems of collinearity). All tests are restricted to non-European cases, in conformance with 
conventional formats. 
These tests show that alternate pathways from Europe carry the expected signs – colonial 
rule is positively associated with democracy and indirect rule negative associated with democracy. 
However, neither relationship is especially strong judging from t statistics. By contrast, the 
relationship between European ancestry and democracy retains strength in all tests and estimates 
are comparable to corresponding models in Table 1. 
To be clear, we are not arguing that other pathways of European influence are irrelevant 
to the fate of democracy. However, the crossnational evidence suggests that demography is 
probably a more important – or at any rate, a more consistent and long-lived – factor in 
conditioning regimes in the modern era.  
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Table G.2:  Alternate Measures of European Influence 
Model 1 2 3 4 
European ancestry (%) 0.33*** 0.24*** 0.38*** 0.27*** 
     (4.14) (3.09) (4.22) (2.95) 
Colonial rule 0.02** 0.03**   
 (2.28) (2.13)   
Indirect rule   -3.71 -2.45 
   (-1.56) (-0.80) 
Harbor distance -0.01** -1.89e-3 -2.29e-3 -3.22e-5 
 (-2.21) (-0.69) (-0.81) (-0.01) 
Latitude 16.92** 1.92 3.29 3.86 
 (2.53) (0.19) (0.35) (0.31) 
Early democracy  10.11***  4.75 
  (3.37)  (1.44) 
Muslim  -0.09*  -0.04 
  (-1.85)  (-0.69) 
Resource income  -8.37e-4***  -6.91e-4 
  (-4.02)  (-0.87) 
GDP per capita (ln)  6.73***  4.67*** 
       (4.36)  (3.43) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies  ✓  ✓ 
Countries 154 142 87 86 
Years 1789-2009 1800-2006 1789-2009 1800-2006 
N 15,029 9,896 9,900 6,643 
R2 .4986 .5510 .5743 .5921 
Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale.  Ordinary least squares 
regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors.  ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10   
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